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AUTHORISATION OF ABORTION FOR A 
"SERIOUS DANGER TO MENTAL 
HEALTH": WOULD THE PRACTICE 
STAND UP TO THE JUDICIAL TEST? 
Amy Dixon* 
In Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, Miller J observed that, 
"there is reason to doubt the lawfulness of many abortions authorised by certifying consultants". 
This article questions this observation through an interpretation of "serious danger … to … mental 
health", the most commonly cited ground for authorisation of abortion. Is "mental health" limited to 
"absence of mental illness" or does it also include "mental wellbeing", which might allow for a more 
liberal practice? The narrow definition would accord with one objective of the abortion scheme to 
respect the rights of the unborn child. The wider definition would allow certifying consultants to 
freely exercise their medical judgement, a condition on which the abortion scheme is based. This 
article argues that the latter argument is potentially stronger, but its success rests on the willingness 
of the judiciary to engage in ambulatory statutory interpretation in the controversial context of 
abortion. This article concludes by noting that a finding in favour of the narrow definition of mental 
health still confers substantial flexibility on consultants in assessing danger of mental illness. 
Finally, this article recommends that Parliament intervene to make the law certain. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Abortion in New Zealand is a crime unless two certifying consultants believe in good faith that 
the woman qualifies for an abortion under the exceptions in s 187A of the Crimes Act 1961.1 
Despite this, New Zealand has a comparable rate of abortion to that of jurisdictions in which women 
  
* Submitted as part of the LLB(Hons) programme at Victoria University of Wellington. I would like to thank 
Claudia Geiringer for her superb guidance and support. 
1  The statutory rules regulating abortion are found in ss 182–187A of the Crimes Act 1961, the Crimes 
Amendment Act 1977 and ss 10–46 of the Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act 1977. These 
provisions will collectively be referred to as the abortion legislation. 
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have a guaranteed right to abortion.2 It would appear that the reason for this is the consultants' 
application of the exception which allows for abortion where the continuance of pregnancy would 
result in "serious danger … to … mental health" (the mental health exception).3 Ninety eight per 
cent of all abortions are authorised under this exception.4  
These noteworthy statistics led Miller J, in the 2008 High Court decision of Right to Life New 
Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee (Right to Life), to observe that: "There is reason 
to doubt the lawfulness of many abortions authorised by certifying consultants". 5  His Honour 
doubted that so many women would be able to establish that continuance of pregnancy would result 
in a risk of a recognised diagnosis of mental illness,6 which he assumed is what would constitute the 
necessary "serious danger … to … mental health".7  
Although the Court of Appeal has since ruled that Miller J's observations have "no lawful 
effect", the question of whether the consultants' approach to the mental health exception is lawful 
remains up in the air.8 A future finding of unlawfulness could significantly impact current abortion 
availability. Some doubt remains as to whether consultants are applying the law as liberally as 
Miller J assumed. If his Honour's doubts prove to be correct, however, current practice remains 
vulnerable to judicial determination of the scope of the mental health exception.  
This article will test whether a court would uphold Miller J's assumption that "serious danger … 
to … mental health" must rest on a recognised diagnosis of mental illness.9 The main enquiry will 
be as to the meaning of "mental health": is "mental health" limited to the narrow definition of mental 
health, that is, "absence of mental illness", as Miller J assumed? Or does it include the wide 
definition of mental health, that is, "mental wellbeing", which might account for consultants' more 
liberal application? 
The case for the narrow definition rests on the argument that it would uphold the objective of the 
abortion scheme to respect the rights of the unborn child. The main argument in favour of the wide 
definition is that it would accord with the scheme's concurrent aim to allow consultants to freely 
  
2  Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee [2008] 2 NZLR 825 (HC) at [56]. 
Jurisdictions referred to include Canada and the United States. 
3  Crimes Act, s 187A(1)(a). 
4  Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, above n 2, at [56]. 
5  At [56].  
6  At [5]. 
7  At [125]. 
8  The Abortion Supervisory Committee v Right to Life New Zealand Inc [2011] NZCA 246, [2012] 1 NZLR 
176 at [137]. 
9  At [125]. 
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exercise their medical judgement, in light of growing recognition by the medical profession of the 
wide definition of mental health. This article suggests that the latter argument is potentially stronger, 
but its success will largely depend on the courts' willingness to engage in ambulatory interpretation 
in the controversial context of abortion law. Further, this article finds that a human rights analysis, 
despite raising some interesting questions, would not support the wide definition. 
This article suggests that a finding in favour of the wide definition of mental health would mean 
that the meaning of the mental health exception could accord with practice. In the alternative, this 
article finds that if a court did adopt the narrow definition, consultants would still have substantial 
flexibility to consider all relevant factors in assessing whether continuance of pregnancy would 
result in a risk of mental illness, which should not be limited to "recognised" mental illness. 
Ultimately, this article suggests that Parliament should intervene to make the law certain.  
II ABORTION LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 
To begin, it is necessary to lay down some background to the law regulating abortion in New 
Zealand. Under the Crimes Act 1961, it is illegal to "unlawfully" procure10 or supply the means of 
procuring 11  an abortion or "miscarriage". 12  Until 1977, the courts defined the meaning of 
"unlawfully" in these two sections.13 Shortly before the enactment of current abortion law in 1977, 
the Court of Appeal confirmed in R v Woolnough that abortion would be lawful where there was a 
serious danger to the life, or physical or mental health of a woman.14  
Amidst much societal debate around abortion, the Government established the Royal 
Commission of Inquiry into Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion in 1975,15 which reported in 
  
10  Crimes Act, s 183. 
11  Section 186. Sections 183 and 186 of the Crimes Act derive from ss 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861 (UK) 24 & 25 Vict c 100. 
12  Miscarriage is defined in s 182A of the Crimes Act as "the destruction or death of an embryo or fetus after 
implantation" or "the premature expulsion or removal of an embryo or fetus after implantation, otherwise 
than for the purpose of inducing the birth of a fetus believed to be viable or removing a fetus that has died". 
13  Nicola Peart "Prevention and Termination of Life before Birth" in PDG Skegg and Ron Paterson (eds) 
Medical Law in New Zealand (Thomson Brookers, Wellington, 2006) 473 at 484. 
14  R v Woolnough [1977] 2 NZLR 508 (CA). This case confirmed the exception outlined in R v Bourne [1939] 
1 KB 687 (Court of Criminal Appeal). 
15  Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, above n 2, at [9]; see also Abortion 
Services in New Zealand "A brief history of abortion laws in New Zealand" (2 May 2005) 
<www.abortion.gen.nz>. 
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1977. 16 The Royal Commission's recommendations formed the basis for the enactment of the 
Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Act 1977 and the Crimes Amendment Act 1977.17   
In accordance with these Acts, the grounds for abortion under 20 weeks' gestation18 are if:19 
• continuance of the pregnancy would result in serious danger (not being danger normally 
attendant upon childbirth) to the life, or to the physical or mental health of the mother (this 
is the ground which includes the mental health exception); or 
• there is a substantial risk of severe foetal abnormality; or 
• the pregnancy is a result of incest or unlawful sex with a guardian; or 
• the mother is severely mentally subnormal. 
Though not grounds in themselves, sexual violation or extremes of age may be taken into 
account in determining danger to life or health.20 
To obtain an abortion, a woman must first consult her doctor.21 If that doctor believes that one 
of the grounds for abortion may apply, he or she may refer the woman to two consultants.22 An 
abortion may not be performed unless two consultants issue a certificate of authorisation,23 after 
forming the opinion that one of the above grounds applies.24 Consultants are protected from civil or 
criminal liability if they make this decision in good faith.25 
  
16  Royal Commission on Contraception Sterilisation and Abortion Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion 
in New Zealand: Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry (Government Printer, 1977). 
17  On introducing the Bill, the Government said it encapsulated the Royal Commission's recommendations. 
The Government made slight amendments which do not significantly affect the issue in this article during 
the legislative process. See Margaret Sparrow Abortion Then & Now: New Zealand Abortion Stories from 
1940 to 1980 (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2010) at 149. 
18  Under s 187A(3) of the Crimes Act, after 20 weeks' gestation, abortion may only be authorised to save the 
life of the mother, or to prevent serious permanent injury to her physical or mental health. 
19  Crimes Act, s 187A(1).  
20  Section 187A(2). 
21  Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act, s 32.  
22  Ibid s 32. The woman's own doctor may also act as one of these certifying consultants. 
23  Ibid s 29.  
24  Ibid s 33.  
25  Ibid s 40. Subsequent performance of an abortion is lawful under s 187(4) of the Crimes Act where a 
practitioner acts on the certificate issued by the consultants, unless the practitioner does not believe that the 
consultant had a good faith opinion that one of the grounds were satisfied. 
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The Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Act also establishes the Abortion Supervisory 
Committee (ASC). 26  The ASC has a number of statutory functions under that Act. 27  These 
functions include general oversight of abortion law, 28 ensuring consistent administration of the 
law,29 appointing and removing consultants,30 and reporting on the law's operation to Parliament.31  
III  RIGHT TO LIFE NEW ZEALAND INC V THE ABORTION 
SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE 
The operation of the ASC and the abortion legislation have recently come under the scrutiny of 
the High Court and the Court of Appeal in proceedings originally brought by Right to Life New 
Zealand Inc (Right to Life) for judicial review of the ASC.32 Right to Life's primary concern in 
those proceedings was that abortion in New Zealand is unlawfully available "on request".33 Right to 
Life attributed this situation to what it said was the failure of the ASC to ensure that consultants are 
properly applying the mental health exception.34  
In the 2008 High Court decision of Right to Life,35 Miller J heard Right to Life's claim that the 
ASC was failing to exercise its statutory functions because it was not ensuring that the consultants 
were properly applying the grounds for abortion.36 The ASC argued in response that it had correctly 
refrained from reviewing consultants' authorisation decisions in line with the Court of Appeal 
  
26  Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act, s 10. The Abortion Supervisory Committee (ASC) consists 
of three members, two of whom must be medical practitioners. 
27  Section 14(1). 
28  Section 14(1)(a). 
29  Section 14(1)(i). 
30  Section 30. 
31  Section 14(1)(k).  
32  Right to Life New Zealand Inc is a charitable society which aims to protect the rights of the unborn child; 
see Right to Life New Zealand "About/Contact Us" (2012) <www.righttolife.org.nz>. 
33  Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, above n 2, at [4]. 
34  Ibid at [4]. 
35  At [35]; see Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee HC Wellington CIV-
2005-485-999, 31 March 2008 for the earlier procedural history. 
36  At [37]. 
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decision in Wall v Livingston.37 In Wall v Livingston, the Court of Appeal found that neither the 
Court nor the ASC could challenge the individual clinical judgements of consultants.38  
In Right to Life, Miller J concluded that the ASC had misinterpreted its legislative powers and 
functions.39 His Honour found that the ASC had wrongly reasoned that Wall v Livingston meant it 
could not review or scrutinise consultants' decisions at all.40 In his opinion, the decision in Wall v 
Livingston did not prevent the ASC from reviewing consultants' authorisation decisions after the 
abortion had been carried out. 41 He found that the ASC should exercise its power to require 
consultants to keep proper records of, and report on, cases that they have considered.42 This would 
allow the ASC to fulfil its functions of overseeing and ensuring consistent application of the law, 
appointing and removing consultants, and of reporting to Parliament.43 To the extent necessary to 
perform these functions, he found that the ASC may form its own view of the lawfulness of the 
consultants' decisions.44 
In the course of his decision, Miller J acknowledged Right to Life's concern by observing that 
there is "reason to doubt the lawfulness of many abortions authorised by certifying consultants".45 
His Honour doubted that consultants were applying the mental health exception as Parliament had 
intended.46 He noted that New Zealand's abortion rate is comparable to that of jurisdictions where 
women have a guaranteed right of access to abortion,47 and that 99 per cent of all requests for 
abortion are approved.48 He was suspicious of the application of the mental health exception in 
  
37  At [41]; Wall v Livingston [1982] 1 NZLR 734 (HC). This case concerned an application for judicial review 
by a doctor of a decision by two certifying consultants to authorise an abortion for a teenage girl. The doctor 
believed there were no grounds under s 187A of the Crimes Act to authorise the abortion. 
38  Wall v Livingston, ibid.  
39  Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, above n 2, at [5].  
40  At [5]. 
41  At [66]. At [123], Miller J draws a distinction between review before the abortion is carried out, and "after-
the-fact" review. 
42  At [132]. Miller J found this power was available under s 36 of the Contraception, Sterilisation, and 
Abortion Act. 
43  At [5]. 
44  Ibid. 
45  Ibid. 
46  At [56]. 
47  Ibid.  
48  At [47]. Statistics showing the comparison of approved to declined requests are not included in the ASC's 
annual reports to Parliament. The evidence supporting the approval rate of 99 per cent reported by Miller J 
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particular because of the fact that 98 per cent of approvals are made under that ground.49 Miller J 
found further support for his observation in some of the ASC's comments in its annual reports to 
Parliament.50 For example, in 2000 the ASC noted that the abortion legislation's procedures "are not 
being followed as the law intended".51 In 2005, it stated that "the wording has come to have a de 
facto liberal interpretation".52  
Underlying Miller J's observation was the assumption that authorisation under "serious danger 
… to … mental health" could only be lawful if it rested on a real risk of a recognised diagnosis of 
mental illness. 53  His Honour doubted that so many women would be able to establish that 
continuance of pregnancy would pose such a risk.54 Though he made no final conclusion, Miller J 
suggested, in line with Right to Life's concern, that New Zealand unlawfully has abortion "on 
request".55  
On appeal, the Court of Appeal by a majority overturned Miller J's finding that the ASC could 
review consultants' authorisations after the fact.56 The majority found that after-the-fact review of 
consultants' authorisations would be inconsistent with Wall v Livingston.57 The majority highlighted 
that the Court in Wall v Livingston emphasised the general nature of the ASC's oversight function 
and found that these functions should be completely removed from the medical decisions of 
consultants.58 The majority of the Court of Appeal in Right to Life thus concluded that the functions 
and powers of the ASC did not extend to after-the-fact review.59  
  
in Right to Life New Zealand was based on data collected on a one-off basis. Miller J referred to data 
showing approval rates of the 20 highest fee earning consultants. This was provided in response to a request 
in 2005. He also referred to statistics showing the rate of approvals in the Christchurch region. This was 
collected manually, specifically for the case. (Obtained under Official Information Act 1982 Request to the 
Abortion Supervisory Committee). 
49  At [56]. 
50  Ibid. 
51  Report of the Abortion Supervisory Committee (2000) cited in Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion 
Supervisory Committee, ibid at [51]. 
52  Report of the Abortion Supervisory Committee (2005) cited in Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion 
Supervisory Committee, ibid at [50]. 
53  At [125]. 
54  At [56] and [125]. 
55  At [56]. 
56  The Abortion Supervisory Committee v Right to Life New Zealand Inc, above n 8, at [109]. 
57  At [109]. 
58  At [98]. 
59  At [100]. 
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Because of their finding that the ASC does not have the power to review decisions of certifying 
consultants, the majority of the Court of Appeal also found that it was inappropriate for Miller J to 
have made observations about the lawfulness of consultants' authorisations. They concluded that his 
comments have "no lawful effect".60  
In contrast to the majority's decision, Arnold J, dissenting, expressed approval of Miller J's 
findings in the High Court. Arnold J agreed that the ASC's statutory powers and functions allowed 
for after-the-fact review,61 and that such review would not be inconsistent with Wall v Livingston.62 
His Honour stressed that the ASC would only need to review the decisions to the extent necessary to 
fulfil its functions of evaluating the operation of the abortion legislation and appointing or removing 
consultants.63 He also agreed with Miller J that the statistical data on abortion rates "gives ground 
for concern" that the consultants are not applying the mental health exception as Parliament 
intended.64  
IV  IS THE PRACTICE STILL VULNERABLE TO 
MILLER J'S DOUBTS? 
Although the Court of Appeal ruled that Miller J's observations have "no lawful effect",65 the 
issue of whether consultants are misapplying the mental health exception has not yet been laid to 
rest. A conclusive finding that current practice is unlawful could significantly impact the availability 
of abortion. The most significant factor in Miller J's observations which poses a threat to current 
practice is his assumption that authorisation under "serious danger … to … mental health" must rest 
on a real risk of a recognised diagnosis of mental illness. A court could affect current practice if 
interpretation of the mental health exception arises, and the court confirms Miller J's interpretation. 
The interpretation of the mental health exception could yet arise in the courts. Most pertinently, 
the Supreme Court has granted Right to Life leave to appeal the decision in Right to Life.66 The 
Supreme Court has given itself the option to consider the evidential foundations for Miller J's 
observation that there is reason to doubt the lawfulness of consultants' authorisations. It may be 
necessary for the Court to conclusively determine the correct interpretation of the mental health 
exception in that case.  
  
60  At [137]. 
61  At [183]. 
62  At [188]. Arnold J reasoned that the Court in Wall v Livingston would have considered that the ASC's 
general oversight function includes after-the-fact review. 
63  At [179]. 
64  At [197]. 
65  At [137]. 
66  Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee [2011] NZSC 97.  
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The opportunity for interpretation by the courts might be more likely to arise if the Supreme 
Court finds that the ASC has the power to review the consultants' authorisations. The ASC might 
then state a case for the High Court to determine the lawful meaning of the mental health 
exception.67 Further, the issue could arise in judicial review of a decision to revoke a consultant's 
appointment, although it is unclear whether a consultant would actually be able to bring judicial 
review of such a decision.68 
On the law as it currently stands, all possible avenues of review of consultants' authorisations 
involve establishing that the authorisation was made in bad faith.  These avenues include a bad faith 
review by the courts or by the ASC,69 the criminal law or a complaint to the Health and Disability 
Commissioner.70 Interpretation of the mental health exception could still, however, arise in these 
forums.71 Bad faith involves the commission of an error with knowledge that the error is being 
committed.72 Interpretation of the exception may first be relevant to establishing commission of an 
error. Secondly, although the factual basis or the reasonableness of the decision is not a 
consideration in establishing knowledge, it may inform whether the belief was honestly held.73  
There are, however, two reasons why a conclusive determination of the correct meaning of the 
mental health exception might not affect current practice. First, there is some evidential doubt that 
the consultants are in fact applying the law as liberally as Miller J suspected. The statistics and the 
ASC's comments reviewed by Miller J do not conclusively indicate that the consultants are applying 
the mental health exception liberally. First, risk of mental illness may be more prevalent among 
women seeking abortion than among pregnant women generally. 74  Second, the high rates of 
approval per consultant may be skewed because the number of declined requests does not include 
  
67  Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Act, s 28. 
68  Under s 30(7) of the Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Act, the ASC may at any time, at its 
discretion, revoke a consultant's appointment. There is no provision for appeal of this decision. For 
discussion of s 30(7) see The Abortion Supervisory Committee v Right to Life New Zealand Inc, above n 8, 
at [29]. 
69  The Abortion Supervisory Committee v Right to Life New Zealand Inc, above n 8, confirming the earlier 
decision of Wall v Livingston, above n 37.  
70  A complaint may be brought for breach of the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers' Rights 
(found in Health and Disability Commissioner (Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers' Rights) 
Regulations 1996) under the Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994, s 31. Under the code, a woman 
has the right to treatment which adheres to legal standards.   
71  Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Act, s 40. 
72  GD Taylor Judicial Review: A New Zealand Perspective (2nd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2010) at 70. 
73  Nicola Peart "Prevention and Termination of Life before Birth", above n 13, at 486. 
74  Miller J acknowledged this possibility in Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory 
Committee, above n 2, at [54]. 
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women who consider abortion, but do not get to the stage of referral to the first consultant.75 Before 
referral, a woman first consults her own doctor who decides whether the criteria may apply.76 The 
woman is then offered counselling before being referred to the first consultant.77 Inevitably, the 
doctor may sometimes decide a woman does not meet the criteria for referral or a woman might 
herself decide not to proceed prior to referral.  
Further, the ASC's comments that consultants are liberally applying the law are not necessarily 
indicative of the true situation. The comments appeared in brief annual reports which cover a range 
of issues.78 The comments may also have been overstated because they were made at the same time 
that the ASC recommended that the law be liberalised.79 The comments may thus simply reflect the 
membership at the time. The current committee, appointed in 200780 has not made such comments 
in its reports.81 Thus, these factors indicate that there is a real possibility that there is no issue 
because consultants are not applying the law as liberally as Miller J would suggest. 
The second reason that the consultants' approach might yet be unaffected by a conclusive 
determination of the meaning of the mental health exception is that even if consultants are taking a 
liberal approach, the courts may find that the mental health exception is open to a wider 
interpretation than Miller J assumed. Thus, the question which forms the basis for the remainder of 
the discussion in this article is: would the courts find that "serious danger … to … mental health" is 
limited to a real risk of a recognised diagnosis of mental illness, as Miller J assumed, or, can it be 
interpreted more widely? 
V   INTERPRETATION OF "SERIOUS DANGER … TO … 
MENTAL HEALTH" 
The meaning of the phrase "serious danger … to … mental health" must ultimately be 
considered as a whole. The most contentious issue, however, is the meaning of "mental health". 
More specifically, should it be read narrowly to mean 'absence of illness' or more widely to mean 
  
75  Ibid. Statistics showing numbers of approvals and denials per consultant in Right to Life New Zealand Inc v 
The Abortion Supervisory Committee do not differentiate between the first or second certifying consultant. 
Both first and second certifying consultants are required to complete a form indicating their decision after 
consultation with a woman seeking abortion. These forms are then provided to the Ministry of Justice. 
(Obtained under Official Information Act 1982 Request to the Abortion Supervisory Committee). 
76  Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act, s 32.  
77  Report of the Abortion Supervisory Committee (2010) at 18. 
78  The Abortion Supervisory Committee v Right to Life New Zealand Inc, above n 8, at [196]. 
79  Ibid at [196]. 
80  Report of the Abortion Supervisory Committee (2007) at 4. 
81  From 2006–2010 there have been no such comments in the Abortion Supervisory Committee's annual 
reports to Parliament. 
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'mental wellbeing'? These two possible conceptions of "mental health" will be outlined, and 
arguments in favour of a court adopting each will be considered. Following this, the interpretation of 
the whole phrase "serious danger … to … mental health" will be considered in light of the definition 
of "mental health". 
But first, before embarking on interpretation, it is necessary to outline the tools that will be used. 
The overall task in interpreting the mental health exception, in terms of s 5(1) of the Interpretation 
Act 1999, is to ascertain its meaning from its text in light of its purpose.82 While the wording is the 
most important element in interpretation, it must be given its most natural meaning in light of its 
context and its purpose.83  
"Purpose" is a flexible concept that essentially gives name to the task of reading the words of the 
Act in their whole context.84 Purpose might include, but is certainly not limited to, an inquiry into 
Parliament's subjective intention, or that which the legislators had in mind at the time of 
enactment.85 Beyond the end that Parliament aims to achieve,86 purpose can also mean the theme of 
the legislation.87 Inquiry into purpose should involve consideration of multiple factors including the 
language of the Act, the wider scheme of the Act, the drafting history and the Act's wider context.88  
A wide range of factors will be considered in the interpretation of the abortion legislation. 
Beyond the abortion legislation itself, the Royal Commission report will be used to inform the wider 
context of the phrase and the abortion legislation.89 Rather than treating the report as a conclusive 
indication of the legislation's meaning, the report may be used as confirmation of the meaning 
ascertained from the text in light of its purpose.90 Before these tools are used to determine the 
meaning of "mental health", it is first necessary to set out the possible meanings of mental health.  
  
82  Interpretation Act 1999, s 5(1). 
83  J Burrows and R Carter Statute Law in New Zealand (4th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2009) at 201.  
84  Claudia Geiringer "Shaping the Interpretation of Statutes: Where Are We Now in the Section 6 Debate" in 
Using the Bill of Rights in Civil and Criminal Litigation (Continuing Legal Education New Zealand Law 
Society, Wellington, 2008) 1 at 13. 
85  J Burrows and R Carter Statute Law in New Zealand, above n 83, at 184. 
86  Ibid at 220. 
87  Ibid at 219. 
88  Claudia Geiringer "Shaping the Interpretation of Statutes: Where Are We Now in the Section 6 Debate", 
above n 84. 
89  As was accepted in both The Abortion Supervisory Committee v Right to Life New Zealand Inc, above n 8, 
at [5] and Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, above n 2, at [10]. 
90  R v Aylwin [2008] NZCA 154, (2008) 24 CRNZ 87 at [58] per Glazebrook J.  
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A The Two Alternative Definitions of Mental Health 
Miller J in Right to Life assumed that "mental health" is about mental illness.91 Contrary to this 
assumption, there are broadly two possible conceptions of mental health which might apply to the 
mental health exception.  
The negative definition of health, which Miller J apparently preferred, is the absence of 
illness.92 This definition arises out of a pathogenic approach to health, which concerns treatment 
and prevention of disease.93 According to this conception, "mental health" means the absence of 
mental illness. Thus "mental health" is found at one end of a continuum, and mental illness is at the 
other.94  
There is, however, a competing, positive definition of health, which is about wellbeing. This 
definition is used widely in the growing field of health promotion, which focuses on facilitating 
health as opposed to treating illness.95 The classic positive definition of health is the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) definition, which defines health as "a state of complete physical, mental and 
social wellbeing and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity".96 The WHO defines mental 
health as "a state of wellbeing in which the individual realises his or her own abilities, can cope with 
the normal stresses of life, can work productively and fruitfully, and is able to make a contribution 
to his or her community".97  
Positive mental health consists of complete emotional, psychological and social wellbeing.98 It 
includes protective factors which preserve one's wellbeing. These include psychological and 
emotional capacities, social support, and educational and financial capacities.99 According to Corey 
  
91  Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, above n 2. 
92  Corey LM Keyes "Promoting and Protecting Mental Health as Flourishing: A Complementary Strategy for 
Improving National Mental Health" (2007) 62 American Psychologist 95 at 96. 
93  Ibid at 96. 
94  Ibid. 
95  World Health Organisation Promoting Mental Health: Concepts, Emerging Evidence, Practice: Summary 
Report (Geneva, 2004) at 16. This is a global movement which is supported by the World Health 
Organisation, beginning with the Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion (1986). 
96  Constitution of the World Health Organisation 14 UNTS 185 (signed 22 July 1946, entered into force 7 
April 1948), Preamble. 
97  World Health Organisation Strengthening Mental Health Promotion (Geneva, 2001). 
98  Corey LM Keyes "Promoting and Protecting Mental Health as Flourishing: A Complementary Strategy for 
Improving National Mental Health", above n 92, at 98. 
99  Anne Shaffer and Tuppett Yates "Risk Factors and Protective Factors in Clinical Practice" in Michael T 
Compton (ed) Clinical Manual of Prevention in Mental Health (American Psychiatric Publisher, 
Washington DC, 2010) 29 at 34. 
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Keyes, positive mental health is much more than the opposite of mental illness.100 It is a completely 
different concept.101 Keyes labels positive mental health as "flourishing", a state which he argues 
can co-occur with mental illness.102  
The threshold for obtaining authorisation under "serious danger … to … mental health" would 
vary according to the definition adopted. If "mental health" were defined narrowly, a woman would 
need to show danger of mental illness to obtain authorisation under the mental health exception. 
This may be narrower than consultants' current approach. A finding in favour of this definition 
might therefore upset current practice. In contrast, if "mental health" were defined positively, this 
would allow a more flexible approach of finding danger to mental wellbeing. A finding in favour of 
this definition would provide better protection of current practice. 
Miller J's observations provide no real support for a determination as to which of these 
definitions applies to the mental health exception. His Honour did not conduct a reasoned analysis 
of the abortion legislation before suggesting that authorisation should rest on recognised diagnoses 
of mental illness.103 In making this suggestion, Miller J was most likely partially influenced by the 
fact that the ASC has, in the past, advised consultants to use recognised diagnoses when authorising 
abortion under the mental health exception.104 In doing this, the ASC may have, however, been 
wrong or simply have been acting cautiously. As indicated above, the ASC's interpretation of the 
law may simply reflect its membership at the time.105 It is therefore necessary to delve into full 
interpretation of the mental health exception, starting with arguments which support Miller J's 
assumption that the narrow definition applies. 
B Arguments for the Narrow Definition of Mental Health 
The main argument in favour of the narrow definition is that adopting the narrow definition 
would better uphold a key purpose of the abortion legislation, which is to ensure that the 
authorisation regime has regard to the rights of the unborn child and therefore should prevent 
abortion 'on demand'. The narrow definition supports this purpose because it sets a higher threshold 
for obtaining abortion. 
  
100  Corey LM Keyes "Promoting and Protecting Mental Health as Flourishing: A Complementary Strategy for 
Improving National Mental Health", above n 92, at 100. 
101  Ibid. 
102  Ibid. 
103  Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, above n 2, at [125]. 
104  Ibid at [57]. 
105  See Part IV of this article. 
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A number of elements of the abortion legislation illustrate this purpose. The Contraception, 
Sterilisation and Abortion Act's long title states that it is "to provide for the circumstances and 
procedures under which abortions may be authorised after having full regard to the rights of the 
unborn child".106 This purpose is also evident in the procedure for appointing consultants. That Act 
precludes the appointment of consultants whose assessment will be coloured by views that are 
deemed to be "incompatible with the tenor of [the] Act".107 The Act states that one such view is that 
whether abortion is appropriate is "entirely a matter for the woman and a doctor to decide". 108 
Further, the very fact that the abortion legislation sets out a specific set of grounds for abortion109 
strongly suggests that it does not intend to make abortion available "on demand".110  
The context of the phrase "mental health" within the legislation would also support the narrow 
definition of mental health. "Mental health" is found in the phrase "serious danger … to the life, or 
to the physical or mental health of the woman or girl".111 The history of this phrase supports the 
narrow definition. In R v Bourne, the case which first proposed this wording, the Court widened the 
original test of preservation of the life of the woman to include dangers to both physical and mental 
health because the Court was of the opinion that these dangers would also threaten life.112 The 
Court in that case equated serious danger to mental health with causing the woman to become a 
"mental wreck".113 Second, the section which includes the mental health exception also lists two 
factors which consultants may take into account when deciding whether a "serious danger" exists. 
These are either that pregnancy is a result of sexual violation or that the woman is at the beginning 
or end of her child-bearing years.114 Notably, social and economic factors, which would be key 
factors in assessing danger to wellbeing, are not included in this list of factors to be taken into 
account. Though inconclusive, together this contextual evidence tends to support the narrow 
definition. 
  
106  Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act. "Rights" do not include a legal right life as confirmed in 
both Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee, above n 2, and The Abortion 
Supervisory Committee v Right to Life New Zealand Inc, above n 8. 
107  Section 30(5). 
108  Section 30(5)(b).  
109  Crimes Act, s 187A. 
110  Ian Bassett "Liability of Health Professionals for a Breach of the Abortion Law in New Zealand" (2001) 9 
Journal of Law & Medicine 115.  
111  Crimes Act, s 187A. See Part II of this article. 
112  R v Bourne, above n 14, at 692. 
113  At 693–694.  
114  Crimes Act, s 187A(2).   
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The Royal Commission report provides strong confirmation of these arguments in favour of the 
narrow definition. The report suggests that preventing abortion 'on demand' is a key purpose of the 
legislation. The report stated that it is wrong to terminate unborn life "for reasons of social 
convenience".115 Preventing abortion 'on demand' was the key consideration for the Commission in 
determining the appropriate grounds for abortion.116 For this reason, it recommended inclusion of 
the words "not being danger normally attendant on childbirth" (included after "serious danger").117 
In the Commission's view, abortion would not be justified by "psychological stress which was 
relatively short in duration or of relatively mild intensity".118 For the same reason, the Commission 
chose not to recommend that socio-economic issues be a ground for abortion.119  
The report also provides specific support for the suggestion that the legislation was drafted with 
the narrow definition in mind. The report states that health should be defined as "a condition of 
physical and mental soundness".120 The Commission could find "no real justification" for adopting 
the WHO definition of health.121 The Commission was again concerned that adopting this definition 
might lead to abortion 'on demand'.122  
As illustrated, there is strong support within the legislation, with confirmation from the Royal 
Commission report for Miller J's assumption that "mental health" should be narrowly defined. The 
narrow definition corresponds with the purpose of having regard to the unborn child in authorising 
abortion. There is, however, also support for an argument against Miller J's assumption, in favour of 
finding that "mental health" can be defined more widely, which would allow for a more liberal 
interpretation by consultants. 
C Arguments in Favour of the Wide Definition of Mental Health 
There are two contextual elements of the abortion legislation which may support the wide 
definition. The first is that allowing for the wide definition of "mental health" would be consistent 
with a concurrent purpose of the legislation. This second purpose of the abortion legislation is that 
  
115  Royal Commission on Contraception Sterilisation and Abortion Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion 
in New Zealand: Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry, above n 16, at 200. 
116  Ibid. 
117  See Part II of this article for the wording in its context. 
118  Royal Commission on Contraception Sterilisation and Abortion Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion 
in New Zealand: Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry, above n 16, at 270. 
119  At 272. 
120  At 270. 
121  See in this article Part V, heading A. 
122  Royal Commission on Contraception Sterilisation and Abortion Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion 
in New Zealand: Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry, above n 16, at 204. 
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consultants must be free to exercise their medical judgement in making an assessment of an abortion 
application. Any developments in the conception of "mental health" should therefore be able to be 
considered as part of a consultant's professional judgement. The second element which may support 
the wide definition is that the legislation should be read in conjunction with the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990123 and with the common law presumption of consistency with international law.124 
1 Leaving interpretation of "mental health" to medical judgement 
The Royal Commission's concern for protecting the rights of the unborn child came against the 
backdrop of the more fundamental decision to place the authorisation of abortion wholly in the 
hands of the medical profession. At the time that the Royal Commission recommended that the 
narrow definition be adopted, it did not appear to foresee that its aim of protecting the rights of the 
unborn child might come to conflict with its concurrent proposal to give consultants the discretion to 
make medical decisions. It did not appear to foresee that its proposed narrow definition of mental 
health might one day conflict with modern medical judgement. Although it did not expressly 
address the issue, the Commission arguably assumed that the narrow definition would accord with 
contemporary medical judgement, thus, this conflict would not arise. Today, however, there is an 
argument that allowing for the wide definition of mental health would be consistent with the desire 
of the legislation to give consultants the flexibility to exercise their medical judgement.  
For this argument to prevail there must first be evidence that the notion that consultants should 
be free to exercise their medical judgement is a key purpose of the abortion legislation. Second, 
conceptions of mental health must have developed in such a way that to restrict "mental health" to 
its narrow definition would conflict with this purpose. Third, the phrase "mental health" within the 
legislation itself must be flexible enough to encompass the wider definition. And finally, this 
argument must be reconciled with the clear design of the legislation to give regard to the rights of 
the unborn child.  
Turning to the first of these issues, the legislation itself, supported by case law, provides clear 
evidence that a key purpose of the legislation is that consultants must be free to exercise their 
medical judgement. Keeping in mind the earlier discussion on statutory interpretation, it is helpful to 
repeat that "purpose" may come in varying forms. While the purpose of protecting the rights of the 
unborn child comes more in the form of an aim or intention, ensuring that the consultants are free to 
exercise medical judgement is more a subtle theme of the abortion scheme which is essential to its 
proper function.  
The abortion legislation clearly sets up a scheme which relies on the consultants' judgement. The 
legislation provides little in the way of guidance in applying the grounds for abortion. The grounds, 
  
123  Section 6. 
124  See for example Zaoui v Attorney-General (No 2) [2005] NZSC 38, [2006] 1 NZLR 289. 
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including "serious danger ... to ... mental health", are set out in general terms without more specific 
indication of the conditions that would satisfy the criteria. In this the legislation recognises that the 
law should not interfere with what is essentially a medical judgement. As well as not restricting 
discretion, the legislation also protects consultants from any criminal or civil liability where 
authorisations are made in good faith. 125 This ensures that consultants can exercise their free 
judgement without fear of repercussions.  
The courts have consistently recognised that the legislation envisages authorisation as a medical 
decision and accordingly demands a degree of deference. The main reason behind the finding that 
authorisation decisions should not be open to review is that consultants should be free to exercise 
their judgement without fear of having their decisions substituted. In Wall v Livingston Woodhouse 
P, in concluding that neither the courts nor the ASC can review individual consultants' decisions, 
noted that authorisation depended on a "medical assessment pure and simple".126 He noted that 
"adverse medical implications" might arise if decisions were reviewable.127  Miller J in Right to Life 
also recognised that because authorisation decisions are medical,128 there should be "room for the 
exercise of judgement".129 The medical nature of authorisation was also a key reason in the Court of 
Appeal's finding that the ASC cannot review consultants' decisions at all.130  
To assess whether this purpose is affected by the interpretation of the mental health exception, it 
is important to look at the underlying justification for allowing flexibility in medical judgement. The 
justification for this is that this is essential to preserving the integrity of the doctor-patient 
relationship. Aside from the obvious concern that patients may not receive the best treatment if 
doctors cannot freely exercise their judgement, the law can create an ethical conflict for doctors if it 
requires them to act according to law which conflicts with their own medical judgement. To doctors, 
exercising medical judgement is just as important, if not more important, than the law. As Thomas 
Faunce argues, medical professionals consider relevant legal principles only after having first 
engaged their professional conscience. 131  They interpret the law by trying to fit it into their 
  
125  Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act, s 40. 
126  Wall v Livingston, above n 37, at 739. 
127  At 739. 
128  Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee New Zealand, above n 2, at [18]. 
129  At [125]. 
130  The Abortion Supervisory Committee v Right to Life New Zealand Inc, above n 8, at [98]. 
131  Thomas Faunce "Health Legislation and International Human Rights" in Suzanne Corcoran and Stephen 
Bottomley (eds) Interpreting Statutes (Federation Press, Annadale (NSW), 2005) 299 at 315. 
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"community of principle" which includes medical ethics, health law and other values found in 
international human rights.132  
A key principle in medical ethics is the principle of beneficence, which requires doctors always 
to act in their patient's best interests, which includes using best medical judgement.133 In the New 
Zealand context, this notion can be seen in the New Zealand Medical Association's principles 
including those of prioritising patient well-being, striving to give the best possible advice and 
treatment and honouring the profession in a way to best serve the patient's interests. 134  In 
accordance with the principle of beneficence, in the context of abortion authorisation, a consultant 
aims to use his or her most up-to-date medical knowledge to assess whether there is a "serious 
danger … to ... mental health". If his or her knowledge does not accord with the law, an ethical 
conflict will arise which may threaten the stability of the abortion scheme. 
Thus, the second issue to be resolved is whether such a conflict would in fact arise today when 
consultants are applying the mental health exception. When the abortion legislation was initially 
drafted, it was foreseen that flexibility in medical judgement would only be necessary around 
assessment of "serious danger". The Royal Commission expected that there would be some variation 
in the consultants' assessment of the degree of danger posed by pregnancy.135 At the same time, the 
Commission expressed disapproval of the wide definition of mental health without concern that this 
would have an adverse effect on medical judgement either at the time or in the future.136  
Today, however, the conception of mental health has developed to the point that this could 
create a conflict for consultants. There is no information available on exactly how consultants view 
"mental health" in their everyday practice.137 What is clear, however, is that since 1977, the wide 
definition of health has become significantly more prominent within the context in which 
consultants work. Consultants are medical practitioners,138 many of whom also work as general 
practitioners in the primary healthcare system.139  
  
132  Ibid at 315. 
133  Jonathan Herring Medical Law and Ethics (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) at 24.  
134  New Zealand Medical Association Code of Ethics: For the New Zealand Medical Profession (Wellington, 
2008) at 5. 
135  Royal Commission on Contraception Sterilisation and Abortion Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion 
in New Zealand: Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry, above n 16, at 285. 
136  At 270. 
137  As far as the author is aware. 
138  Under s 30 of the Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act, certifying consultants are medical 
practitioners, of which half must be practising obstetricians or gynaecologists. 
139  See Abortion Services in New Zealand "Certifying Consultants" (29 January 2012) <www.abortion.gen.nz> 
for a relatively recent list of certifying consultants and their site of practice.  
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The wide definition of health has become increasingly relevant in the New Zealand primary 
health system with the growth of the health promotion field since the 1980s.140 More recently, the 
Government now expects primary healthcare to engage more in mental health promotion.141 The 
Ministry of Health's most recent mental health plan emphasises that the health system must expand 
its focus to the wellbeing of all New Zealanders and emphasises the need to address protective 
factors as well as risk factors for mental health.142  
The wide definition of mental health is also becoming more important in addressing mental 
health issues. General practitioners play a key role in mental healthcare as the first port of call for 
those with such issues. 143 There is growing recognition in mental healthcare literature of the 
"recovery model" of care,144 which in accordance with the wide definition of mental health, focuses 
on restoring a patient's subjective wellbeing and self-worth as opposed to simply treating illness.145 
The use of this model of mental healthcare in New Zealand is growing.146 It is likely that these 
changes in environment would at least affect some consultants' views of mental health. 
Consequently, an ethical conflict might arise out of the clash between the consultant's knowledge 
and what the law demands if "mental health" were to be restricted to its narrow definition. 
Despite this, the legislative phrase "mental health" must yet be legally capable of 
accommodating this updated meaning. Changed circumstances, such as these developments in the 
accepted definition of "mental health", can sometimes be accommodated through the ambulatory 
approach to statutory interpretation. In New Zealand, this approach is enshrined in the Interpretation 
Act 1999, which states that "enactments apply to circumstances as they arise".147 Accordingly, 
  
140  John Smith "Strategies for Strengthening the Health Promotion Workforce An Academic's Perspective" 
(2006) Health Promotion Forum of New Zealand <www.hauora.co.nz>. 
141  Ministry of Health Primary Health Organisations: Service Development Toolkit for Mental Health Services 
in Primary Health Care (Ministry of Health, Wellington, 2004) at 23. 
142  Ministry of Health Te Tāhuhu – Improving Mental Health 2005–2015: The Second Mental Health and 
Addiction Plan (Ministry of Health, Wellington, 2005) at 8. 
143  Anthony O'Brien, Fiona Moir and Katey Thom "The Provision of Mental Health Care by Primary Health 
Organisations in the Northern Region: Barriers and Enablers" (2009) 1 J Primary Health Care 120 at 120. 
144  Lola Ianovski "Should Recovery Practices Within Mental Health Services Be Monitored? If so, How Can 
Organisation Recovery Orientation be Measured? A Qualitative Inquiry" (MHSc Dissertation, Auckland 
University of Technology, 2009) at 2. 
145  Jim Campbell, Theo Stickley and Sarah Bonney "Recovery as a Framework for Care Planning" in Angela 
Hall, Mike Wren, and Stephan Kirby (eds) Care Planning in Mental Health: Promoting Recovery 
(Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2008) 113 at 113. 
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147  Interpretation Act 1999, s 6. 
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where appropriate, a court may recognise changes in the meaning of statutory concepts,148 though 
only where the change fits within the wording and purpose of the Act.149 That is, where the change 
fits within the general 'concept' of the Act.150 
The wording in the statute in question must therefore be flexible enough to encompass any 
change in meaning. The meaning of flexible or "mobile" expressions151 such as "indecent"152 may 
be updated because they encompass a subjective standard which reflects contemporary 
circumstances. 153 Whether an expression can be treated as "mobile" depends on the text and 
purpose of the Act.154 If the 'concept' of the Act treats the expression as determinate, to accept any 
changes in meaning would arguably be changing the law.155  
The line between "mobile" and determinate expressions is not entirely clear.156 The English 
courts have taken a more expansive approach than New Zealand courts have in finding "mobility". 
The courts have found that the meaning of "family" has changed 157 despite the fact that the 
legislature would have originally intended for the expression to have a determinate meaning.158 The 
House of Lords held in Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Ltd, that "family" included a flexible element 
and would thus include a gay partner.159 This more expansive approach might be explained by the 
fact that "family" was held to be "mobile" to fulfil the purpose of the Act in question.160 It is unclear 
  
148  Mark T Bradley "The Ambulatory Approach at the Bottom of the Cliff: Can the Courts Correct Parliament's 
Failure to Update Legislation?" (2003) 9 Canta L Rev 1 at 1; R (on the application of Quintavalle) v 
Secretary State for Health [2003] UKHL 13, [2003] 2 AC 687 at [25]. 
149  J Burrows and R Carter Statute Law in New Zealand, above n 83, at 398. 
150  Birmingham City Council v Oakley [2001] 1 AC 617 (HL) per Lord Hoffman. 
151  Director of Public Prosecutions v Jordan [1977] AC 699 (HL) at 719.  
152  R v Dunn [1973] 2 NZLR 481 (CA).  
153  Mark T Bradley "The Ambulatory Approach at the Bottom of the Cliff: Can the Courts Correct Parliament's 
Failure to Update Legislation?", above n 148, at 23. 
154  Ibid at 24. 
155  Ibid at 25. 
156  J Burrows and R Carter Statute Law in New Zealand, above n 83, at 392. 
157  Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd [2001] 1 AC 27 (HL); Dyson Holdings Ltd v Fox [1976] QB 
503 (CA) although the approach taken in this latter case has since been criticised because it held that 
"family" had changed its linguistic meaning. See for example, Helby v Rafferty [1979] 1 WLR 13 at 25 
(EWCA) and A v R (1999) 17 FRNZ 647 (HC). 
158  J Burrows and R Carter Statute Law in New Zealand, above n 83, at 393. 
159  Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Ltd, above n 157. 
160  Mark T Bradley "The Ambulatory Approach at the Bottom of the Cliff: Can the Courts Correct Parliament's 
Failure to Update Legislation?", above n 148, at 28. 
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whether this approach would be applied in New Zealand. In any event, a court would most likely 
take a cautious approach to ensure that any updated meaning accords with the 'concept' of the 
legislation. 
The essential question at this point is: would a court consider "mental health" to be "mobile" and 
thus open to a wide interpretation? A first adverse factor, directly on point, is that the Royal 
Commission report tends to suggest that "mental health" has a fixed meaning. The Commission 
recommended that the operative definition should be "a condition of physical and mental 
soundness". 161  The report is, however, only an aid to interpretation. Rather than driving 
interpretation, it may help to decide whether "mental health" is "mobile" having regard to the text in 
light of its purpose.  
Most significantly, it would be inconsistent to allow flexibility around "serious danger" but 
confine "mental health" to the narrow definition. The same ethical conflict may arise if consultants 
were not free to exercise medical judgement when applying either definition. There are no studies 
which show exactly how consultants view "mental health". However, given that some consultants 
may legitimately read "mental health" widely according to their medical judgement, it is a real 
probability that an ethical conflict would arise. A consultant would foreseeably be torn between 
their desire to protect the woman's "mental health" or well-being, and the need to obey a discordant 
law. Therefore the purpose of allowing flexibility in medical judgement, which maintains the 
stability of the abortion scheme, would support adoption of the wide meaning of "mental health". 
Finally, before any conclusion may be drawn, this argument must yet be reconciled with the 
whole concept of the legislation, which includes the potentially competing purpose to have regard to 
the rights of the unborn child. Arguably, although this latter purpose favours the narrow definition, 
it is not entirely abrogated by the wide definition. For an abortion to be authorised, the woman must 
still show that continuance of pregnancy would constitute serious danger to her well-being, and thus 
consideration is still given to the unborn child. More importantly, however, the stability of the 
authorisation system resulting from allowing flexibility in medical judgement arguably justifies 
compromising the weight placed on protecting the unborn child. If the law created an ethical conflict 
for the consultants, they may refuse to engage with the authorisation system altogether.  
This reasoning suggests that "mental health" should be considered "mobile" and open to a wide 
definition. This approach would avoid an ethical conflict which would result where consultants' 
wide interpretation of "mental health" does not accord with the law.  
Although this argument has real merit, whether it will be upheld will largely depend on the 
willingness of a court to engage in purposive analysis to update the meaning of "mental health". In 
  
161  Royal Commission on Contraception Sterilisation and Abortion Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion 
in New Zealand: Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry, above n 16, at 270. 
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the face of the strong case for the narrow definition, a court would be concerned to ensure that the 
wide definition is within the 'concept' of the legislation.  
Where the issue is one of social or political importance,162 as it is here, a court may choose to 
leave any change up to Parliament.163 In earlier cases involving abortion issues, the courts have also 
had a tendency to take a more literal, textual approach, rather than a purposive approach to updating 
legislation.164 That said, the courts are not always unwilling to take a purposive approach in cases 
involving abortion. The Court of Appeal in Right to Life took a very purposive approach, by looking 
at the practical implications of allowing review.165 
Thus, the likelihood of this argument's success is unclear. A court may uphold it but it may also 
refuse to consider the ambulatory approach at all, or may look unfavourably on the argument. The 
court may, for example, place more emphasis on the Royal Commission's recommendation of the 
narrow definition, or may refuse to accept that a real ethical conflict could arise.  
2 Human rights 
The second contextual argument potentially in favour of the wide definition is that the abortion 
legislation should be read in conjunction with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and with 
international law. Section 6 of the Bill of Rights Act directs the courts to prefer a meaning 
consistent with the Bill of Rights Act. International law is gaining relevance through the common 
law presumption that Parliament does not intend to legislate contrary to international law.166  
The wide definition of "mental health" may be supported if a woman has a right to access 
abortion under the Bill of Rights Act or international law, and the legislation can be read 
consistently with that right.167 
(a) New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
  
162  J Burrows and R Carter Statute Law in New Zealand, above n 83, at 402; P v K [2003] 2 NZLR 787 (HC) at 
[204]–[205] per Heath J. 
163  P v K, ibid.  
164  See Royal College of Nursing v Department of Health and Social Security [1981] AC 800 (HL) at 822. 
Similarly, in Re a case stated by the Abortion Supervisory Committee [2003] 3 NZLR 87 (HC) the Court 
took a more textual approach to interpretation.  
165  The Abortion Supervisory Committee v Right to Life New Zealand Inc, above n 8, at [100]–[109]. 
166  See Zaoui v Attorney-General (No 2), above n 124; Claudia Geiringer "International Law through the Lens 
of Zaoui: Where is New Zealand At?" (2006) 17 Public Law Review 300 at 321–322.  
167  The effect of a right to life of the foetus on interpretation is not considered because the decisions of Miller J 
in Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee and the Court of Appeal in The 
Abortion Supervisory Committee v Right to Life New Zealand Inc strongly suggest that the foetus does not 
have a right to life.  
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The Bill of Rights Act does not appear to guarantee a right to access abortion. Rights potentially 
engaged by restriction of abortion include the rights to life,168 freedom from torture,169 and non-
discrimination.170 The first two of these would not, however, support an argument in favour of the 
wide definition of mental health. Failing to protect full mental wellbeing would not endanger life or 
amount to treatment "so excessive as to outrage standards of decency".171  
The question of whether a court would accept that the right to be free from discrimination under 
the Bill of Rights Act172 supports adopting the wide definition of mental health deserves more space 
than this article allows.173 It is worth noting, however, a few reasons why it may be difficult to 
establish that the narrow definition of mental health would be inconsistent with this right. This right 
prohibits discrimination on a number of specified grounds, including sex.174 Arguably it is sex 
discrimination to refuse a woman access to abortion because pregnancy and childbirth, which can 
have a potentially adverse impact on a woman's wellbeing, is unique to women.  
Recent case law suggests that, in order to show that there has been discrimination, it may be 
necessary to establish the effect of treatment on a comparator.175 A comparator is someone who is 
in comparable circumstances to the complainant but without the characteristic which is the 
purported ground for discrimination.176 This causes a problem in the abortion context because there 
is no comparable pregnant male. Case law is, however, inconsistent on the need for a comparator.177 
  
168  Section 8. 
169  Section 9. 
170  Section 19. 
171  See Taunoa v Attorney-General [2007] NZSC 70, [2008] 1 NZLR 429; Puli'uvea v Removal Review 
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Hansen.  
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Human Rights Act 1993. 
175  Ministry of Health v Atkinson HC Auckland CIV-2010-404-000287, 17 December 2010; Air New Zealand v 
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176  Air New Zealand v McAlister, ibid at [52] per Tipping J. 
177  For example in Smith v Air New Zealand [2011] NZCA 20, [2011] 2 NZLR 171 the Court did not strictly 
use the comparator exercise. See also Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523 (CA). 
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It may be enough to show that there has been differential treatment on a prohibited ground. This 
might still be difficult to establish because the differential treatment here is arguably because of 
society's will to protect the unborn child, not because of the woman's pregnancy or sex per se.  
Further, a court may generally be reluctant to engage this right in the abortion context, because it 
involves policy issues. In Quilter v Attorney-General, Keith J suggested that the right to non-
discrimination may not apply where the law in question involves "social values and policy". 178 
Finally, the Interim Select Committee report on the Bill of Rights Act suggests that the Bill of 
Rights Act was not intended to apply to abortion legislation. It stated that "the Bill must remain 
neutral on contentious issues such as abortion".179 Thus, this statement, in light of the other hurdles, 
suggests that the Bill of Rights Act would not support the wide definition. 
(b) International law 
There is a plethora of academic literature arguing that a range of rights at international law 
include a right to access abortion.180 Few of these arguments have, however, been accepted at 
international law. A number of the rights used to argue for access to abortion either do not include a 
right to access abortion at all181 or provide such a right only in limited circumstances.182  
At international law, access to abortion is most widely addressed under the right to health. This 
is found in both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights183 and the 
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(2008) 8 HRLR 249. 
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restrictive abortion regimes" (Masters Thesis, Durham University, 2011).  
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(2005). The woman was denied an abortion after discovering that the foetus had an anencephaly. See JM 
Gher and C Zampas "Abortion as a Human Right: International and Regional Standards", above n 180, at 
269–272.  
183  International Convention on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 993 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 16 
December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976). Art 12(1) guarantees that everyone has the right to 
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Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).184 The 
precise scope of the right to health is unclear,185 but broadly it is said to encompass underlying 
preconditions for health, and healthcare which is available, accessible, acceptable, and of adequate 
quality.186  
There is no precise definition at the international level of what the right to health guarantees in 
the abortion context.187 It has not been directly enforced in the abortion context by any international 
body.188 The right to health can arguably be interpreted as requiring governments to remove legal 
restrictions on abortion both to avoid the risks of unsafe abortion and to guarantee access to abortion 
where a woman's health is at risk.189 
The main concern among international policy and treaty-monitoring bodies is preventing the 
risks of unsafe abortion. The preferred solution is prevention of unwanted pregnancy, rather than 
removing legal restrictions on abortion. For example, the 1995 Report on the Fourth World 
Conference on Women acknowledged that unsafe abortion is a major public health concern,190 but 
focused on improving family planning methods and promoting regulation of fertility that is not 
against the law.191  
The CEDAW Committee has continually expressed concern about unsafe abortion in its 
Concluding Observations to State parties, and often focuses on improving family planning 
methods.192 It has never expressly acknowledged that safe, legal abortion is always needed where 
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contraception fails.193 The Committee has, however, recognised that criminalisation of abortion is a 
barrier to appropriate healthcare. 194  The Committee has also continually recognised the link 
between restrictive abortion laws and unsafe abortion in its Concluding Observations.195  
The wide definition of mental health would be more consistent with the right to health than the 
narrow definition because the wide definition provides greater access to legal abortion and thus 
protects more women against unsafe abortion. Limiting "mental health" to the narrow definition may 
restrict access to legal abortion.196 The ASC has noted the connection between restricting legal 
access and unsafe abortion. In 1986, the Committee noted that restrictive abortion laws create unsafe 
abortion for those unable to travel to Australia.197 In 1997, the Committee stated: "If we do not have 
legal abortion we will have illegal abortion and maternal deaths. Making abortion illegal does not 
stop it".198  
Research supports this connection between legality and unsafe abortion. If women are denied 
legal abortion, they will seek abortion elsewhere, even if it is unsafe. A study in the Czech Republic 
showed that women who are denied an abortion go to great lengths to find one elsewhere. 199 
Empirical evidence from Romania shows that the maternal mortality rate is directly affected by the 
restriction or liberalisation of abortion law. After restriction of abortion law in 1966, the mortality 
ratio rose from 20 per 100,000 live births to 148 per 100,000 in 1989. After liberalisation in 1989, 
the rate fell and in 2002 was at nine per 100,000.200  
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Thus, the wide definition may be more consistent with the right to health because this definition 
avoids the risks of unsafe abortion. For this argument to be accepted, it must be shown that the 
courts would be willing to enforce the right to health. International law is not directly enforceable 
unless incorporated into domestic law. 201 There is, however, a common law presumption that 
Parliament does not intend to legislate contrary to human rights.202 Traditionally, the approach to 
this presumption has been: where possible, the wording will be read consistently with international 
law, but this must accord with the purpose of the Act.203  On this approach, the right to health may 
not be enough to support the wide definition of mental health because the definition may undermine 
the purpose of the abortion legislation to have regard to the rights of the unborn child. 
The presumption of consistency has, however, been gaining strength, and arguably, at its most 
extreme, can override the purpose of the Act, as seen in the Supreme Court's rigorous approach in 
Zaoui v Attorney-General (No 2). 204 In that case, the Court held that a statute conferring an 
administrative power to deport Mr Zaoui had to be interpreted consistently with his right, at 
international law and under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, to be free from torture.205 The 
Court came to this conclusion despite indications in the wider statutory scheme that Parliament 
intended otherwise,206 and that this arguably went beyond the statutory purpose.207  
The approach seen in Zaoui suggests that where the "underlying international obligation is 
sufficiently compelling, nothing less than express statutory language may suffice to overcome it".208 
Two factors underpin the Court's assessment in Zaoui of the obligation as sufficiently compelling, 
which indicate the scope of this rigorous approach. First, the judiciary has historically been more 
willing to enforce civil and political rights, such as the right to freedom from torture, than to enforce 
social rights like the right to health. Secondly, the Court took a strict and conservative approach to 
defining the scope of the obligation in question.209 
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Because of the social nature of the right to health, a court is likely to be more reluctant to 
enforce it than to enforce the right to freedom from torture, as in Zaoui. Out of respect for 
parliamentary sovereignty, the courts are reluctant to apply social rights which are more policy-
based, and therefore better suited to statutory implementation.210 The High Court has, for example, 
rejected an argument that a rent increase forcing the complainant to move was a breach of the right 
to an adequate standard of living.211 The Court of Appeal has similarly refused to use international 
law to interpret a statutory right to education.212  
The judiciary would also be reluctant to uphold such rights in light of a clear intention behind 
the Bill of Rights Act not to allow the judiciary to uphold social rights. The Bill which later became 
the Bill of Rights Act excluded economic, social and cultural rights to avoid an "attempt to capture 
(or more accurately to impose) a temporarily popular view of policy". 213 The Interim Select 
Committee report on the Bill of Rights noted that it would be inappropriate for the judiciary to make 
"essentially political" decisions concerning questions of whether legislation "provides an adequate 
standard of health care or affects the right to an adequate standard of living".214  
Even if the right to health were considered justiciable, there are other reasons why the 
presumption of consistency is unlikely to be applied as robustly as it was in Zaoui.215 The very 
cautious approach taken to defining the scope of the international obligation in Zaoui limits the 
situations in which the presumption will apply.216 In Zaoui the international obligation was defined 
even more narrowly than expressly recognised at international law.217 In contrast, the scope of the 
right to health is still murky. It is not clear at international law that this right includes the right to 
access abortion.  
  
210  Claudia Geiringer "Parsing Sir Kenneth Keith's Taxonomy of Human Rights: A Commentary on Illingworth 
and Evans Case" in Rick Bigwood (ed) Public Interest Litigation: New Zealand Experience in International 
Perspective (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2006) 179 at 180. 
211  Lawson v Housing New Zealand [1997] 2 NZLR 474 (HC) at [39]. Williams J held: "Whether New Zealand 
has fulfilled its international obligations is a matter on which it may be judged in international forums but 
not in this Court". 
212  Attorney-General v Daniels [2003] 2 NZLR 742 (CA). 
213  A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper (Department of Justice A6, 1985) at 3.14. 
214  Interim Report of the Justice and Law Reform Select Committee: Inquiry into the White Paper, a Bill of 
Rights for New Zealand, above n 179, at 79. 
215  Claudia Geiringer "International Law through the Lens of Zaoui: Where is New Zealand At?", above n 166, 
at 318. 
216  Ibid at 318. 
217  Ibid at 312. 
 AUTHORISATION OF ABORTION FOR A "SERIOUS DANGER TO MENTAL HEALTH" 317 
Further, the willingness of a court to apply the presumption of consistency will depend on the 
context of the domestic statute. 218 Factors which influence the courts' approach to a breach of 
human rights include the rule in question, the nature of the breach, the forcefulness with which the 
countervailing purpose has been expressed, and legislative history.219 The breach in question here, 
that is, the general possibility of unsafe abortion is much less specific than a clear risk of torture of 
an individual, as in Zaoui.220 Further, the argument for an interpretation consistent with the right to 
health must be considered in the context of the strong argument in favour of the narrow definition 
arising from the abortion legislation and its legislative history. In conclusion, a court would no 
doubt refuse to uphold an argument based on the right to health in support of the wide definition of 
mental health.  
This wide-ranging discussion suggests that human rights law has much to say in the area of 
abortion. The sensitive nature however prevents this argument from moving from the theoretical to 
the practical and thus does not provide any tenable argument for the wide definition of mental 
health. 
In summary of the arguments in favour of each definition, the narrow definition of mental health 
finds strong support in the argument that this will uphold the purpose of the abortion legislation to 
have regard to the rights of the unborn child. There is, however, a competing and potentially 
stronger argument in favour of the wide definition of mental health. That is, "mental health" should 
be interpreted widely to ensure that consultants can freely exercise medical judgement, a condition 
on which the stability of the abortion system is based. It is unclear whether this argument will 
prevail – it predominantly rests on the willingness of a court to engage in a purposive ambulatory 
analysis in the controversial context of abortion. 
D The Meaning of "Serious Danger … to … Mental Health" as a 
Whole 
Finally, the definition of "mental health" must be planted into the whole phrase of "serious 
danger to … mental health" to be considered as a whole. Although the meaning of "serious danger" 
would be flexible according to the need to allow consultants to freely exercise their medical 
judgement, there is some guidance from case law. In R v Woolnough, shortly before enactment of 
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the abortion legislation, the Court found that "serious danger" means "a real and substantial risk of 
serious harm".221 
If a court adopts the wide definition of mental health, "serious danger … to … mental health" 
would most likely cover current practice, even if it proves correct that consultants are liberally 
applying the law. Continuance of pregnancy would create a "serious danger" if it poses a real and 
substantial risk of serious harm to the woman's wellbeing. Ultimately this is a clinical judgement, 
but it seems that this would be met in a range of common situations.222 Pregnancy might negatively 
impact a woman's wellbeing, for example, by putting pressure on her financial situation or her 
relationships. This would allow for the liberal application, which Miller J suspected consultants 
were taking.  
If a court adopts the narrow definition of "mental health", "serious danger … to … mental 
health" may set a higher threshold than under the wide definition, but it still arguably allows 
consultants slightly more flexibility than Miller J assumed. "Serious danger … to … mental health" 
will be met if continuance of pregnancy would create a real and substantial risk of serious harm to 
the woman's state of being free from mental illness. Because this is a clinical judgement, it is not the 
court's place to decide what constitutes the necessary harm.223 
In practice, consultants would presumably assess whether there is risk of mental illness. Some 
consultants might look to whether there is risk of the woman developing a recognised psychiatric 
illness, such as an illness found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.224 
There is no reason why consultants must, however, strictly rest authorisation on a recognised 
diagnosis, as Miller J suggested.225 This would go against common practice. Research shows that 
general practitioners do not often use diagnostic schema in assessing mental illness,226 because they 
are generally perceived as too rigid and complex.227 Thus "serious harm" may be met by something 
less than a recognised diagnosis, so long as the consultant believes it to be such, in good faith.228 
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Further, if the negative definition were adopted, consultants would be free to take into account a 
range of factors in assessing risk, including foreseeable social and economic circumstances, both 
during pregnancy and if the child were born. Miller J in Right to Life recognised this, in noting that 
consultants may consider socio-economic consequences of raising a child in assessing risk of 
recognised mental illness.229  
The application of the mental health exception in New South Wales provides an example of 
such a risk assessment. In New South Wales, the mental health exception is a judicial, rather than 
statutory creation.230 In 1972, in R v Wald the New South Wales District Court231 interpreted 
"serious danger to mental health" as including serious danger arising out of economic, social or 
medical reasons at any time during the currency of the pregnancy.232 This test was applied and 
extended in CES v Superclinics, where Kirby ACJ held that the test would also include danger 
which might arise after the birth of the child.233 That case concerned a 21-year-old student in an 
unstable relationship with limited financial means. His Honour held that the test would clearly be 
met having regard to the foreseeable effects of an unwanted pregnancy in the context of an unstable 
relationship, and of having to give up her studies and thereby her opportunity for fulltime 
employment in her chosen field.234 
The abortion legislation supports this approach to risk assessment. This approach allows 
consultants flexibility in medical judgement, but still has regard to the rights of the unborn child 
because the factors considered must still amount to risk of "serious harm". The indication in the 
legislation that sexual violation and extremes of age may be taken into account in assessing "serious 
danger" does not mean that other factors may not also be taken into account. 235  The Royal 
Commission explicitly recognised that, depending on the woman's personal reaction, socio-
economic factors may result in serious danger to mental health.236 Thus, even where a court adopts 
the narrow definition of mental health, consultants will have significant flexibility to take into 
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account all factors which might amount to real risk of mental illness, according to their own 
judgement. 
VI  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, even if, as Miller J suspected, consultants are authorising abortion under the 
mental health exception for something less than risk of a recognised diagnosis of mental illness, the 
courts may yet uphold this approach as a lawful application of the mental health exception.  
There is a strong argument that the wide definition of mental health should be accepted to 
preserve the stability of the abortion scheme. Allowing the wide definition would accord with 
medical judgement and thus avoid any ethical conflict between medical judgement and the law. As 
suggested, a court may, however, be reluctant to engage in a purposive ambulatory interpretation 
and may thus prefer to adopt the narrow definition.  
Nevertheless, even if a court upholds the narrow definition, consultants still have substantial 
flexibility in exercising medical judgement about what constitutes "serious danger to … mental 
health". Accordingly, preference for the narrow definition may not render current practice as 
vulnerable to challenge as would acceptance of Miller J's assumption that authorisation must rest on 
a recognised diagnosis. 
In light of the limited opportunities for the interpretation of the mental health exception to arise 
in the courts, current practice may, however, simply go on untested. Nonetheless, the legal 
uncertainty around the meaning of the mental health exception and around whether there is a 
discrepancy between the practice and the law is undesirable. According to Joseph Raz, the rule of 
law requires that "the law should be such that people will be able to be guided by it".237 Parliament 
should thus intervene to ensure that the law is certain.  
Given the highly controversial nature of abortion, it seems unlikely, however, that Parliament 
will be willing to engage with the issue. No doubt willingness to intervene would be influenced by 
its perception of the urgency of the issue. It would only make sense for Parliament to engage with 
this issue if current practice, which seems to avoid the risks of unsafe abortion, was under direct 
threat. Perhaps the necessary threat would arise if the Supreme Court overturns the Court of Appeal 
finding in Right to Life to find that the ASC can review abortion authorisations. In the meantime, 
however, New Zealand may simply have to continue to accept the uncertain relationship between 
the practice and the law.  
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